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Tarasoff and Duty to Protect in North Carolina 
A. Keith Mobley, PhD, LPC and Eugene Naughton, JD 
A counselor’s duty to warn and protect third parties of threats made by their clients 
has been a complex, frightening, and confusing topic since the landmark Tarasoff case 
in 1976. Although the implications of this case has been interpreted by a variety of 
state courts and legislatures, the tension between a counselor’s ethical and legal re-
sponsibilities creates consternation for many counselors in North Carolina. This arti-
cle reviews the background and implications of the duty to warn concept to counsel-
ors specifically in the state of North Carolina and provides both proactive and reac-
tive suggestions for managing encounters with potentially violent clients.  
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 In 1976, the California Supreme Court 
handed down its landmark decision in Tarasoff 
v. Regents of the University of California, and the 
effects of that decision are still felt today 
across the nation in both the legal and coun-
seling professions. Because any case decided 
by a state or federal court can create legal rip-
ples that extend beyond the original jurisdic-
tion of the court, one state’s court could be 
applied to another state’s cases.  Conse-
quently, courts, scholars, and mental health 
professionals have struggled to understand the 
implication of the case and its impact on the 
daily practice of counseling in the years since 
Tarasoff. This case was such an important one 
that the crux of that decision – that a clinician 
has an overriding legal duty to break confiden-
tiality when a client makes a viable threat 
against a third party – remains problematic for 
many counselors who are untrained in the law 
and who do not fully understand the limits of 
confidentiality in their state (Walcott, Cerun-
dolo, & Beck, 2001), including those in North 
Carolina. 
 The extensive implications of the Tarasoff 
decision is further complicated by the fact that 
neither the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
(the highest court in the state) nor the state 
legislature has squarely addressed the Tarasoff 
decision. Our intention with this article is to 
ease some of the confusion by revisiting what 
the Tarasoff decision entails, how courts and 
legislatures across the country digested Tara-
soff, and how North Carolina has dealt with 
issues raised in that decision to date. We also 
hope to discuss the ethical and practical impli-
cations raised by Tarasoff and suggest how 
counselors in North Carolina can avoid ethical 
pitfalls that Tarasoff-like situations might raise 
and ensure they are implementing best-
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practices in a proactive fashion.  
 The goal of this article is to help counsel-
ors in NC understand the history and the im-
plications of Tarasoff case in our state and to 
differentiate legal requirements from ethical 
imperatives in similar situations to that case. 
We first provide a background of the Tarasoff 
case, describe the implications of the case de-
cision across the nation, and then discuss the 
interpretation of the case in the state of North 
Carolina. We conclude this article with sugges-
tions of how a mental health professional in 
NC can be proactive in dealing with situations 
involving threats of harm made by a client and 
review steps one can engage in if risk of harm 
toward others is assessed. 
 
The Tarasoff  Decisions: Case  
and Analysis 
 
 To most, the Tarasoff case is shorthand for 
a simple ―duty to warn‖; however, it is much 
more. In fact, there are two Tarasoff decisions, 
and ―duty to warn‖ was only the first obliga-
tion imposed on clinicians in California. As 
seen below, the California Supreme Court ex-
panded the obligations imposed on a clinician 
to a burdensome degree, with many other 
courts following the California Supreme 
Court’s lead and applying the same obligations 
in their own states.    
 The facts are well known. In 1968, Prosen-
jit Poddar, a graduate student at the University 
of California, Berkeley, met fellow student 
Tatiana Tarasoff at a school dance.  Poddar 
misinterpreted a casual kiss as evidence of a 
serious relationship, and soon he became fix-
ated with Tarasoff, who rebuffed Poddar’s 
romantic overtures. Distraught, Poddar 
sought counseling at the University Health 
Services. During eight weeks of therapy, Pod-
dar revealed to a staff psychologist, Dr. 
Moore, that he intended to kill an unnamed 
woman who was readily identifiable as Tatiana 
Tarasoff. Moore consulted with supervisors 
about a course of action and notified campus 
police of the threat. In a letter to the police, 
Moore requested that the police commit Pod-
dar to a mental hospital for observation. Cam-
pus police stopped and questioned Poddar but 
released him after he denied any violent inten-
tions. The police advised Poddar to stay away 
from Tarasoff. Poddar had no further contact 
with the police or the University Health Ser-
vices.  Subsequently, Poddar began stalking 
Tarasoff, and in October 1969, Poddar en-
tered Tarasoff’s home and murdered her with 
a kitchen knife. He was convicted of second-
degree murder, a conviction later reduced to 
manslaughter and ultimately reversed on error.   
 The victim’s parents brought suit against 
the University of California, the campus po-
lice, and the University Health Service clini-
cians. In their complaint, the Tarasoffs alleged 
that the University clinicians ―did in fact pre-
dict that Poddar would kill and were negligent 
in failing to warn‖ (Ref. 2, p. 345). The trial 
court dismissed the suit, ruling that no law 
imposed a duty on a clinician to warn a third 
party of a danger revealed during confidential 
therapy. The Tarasoffs appealed and the case 
eventually worked its way to the California 
Supreme Court. On December 23, 1974, the 
Court overturned the dismissal and remanded 
the case for trial against the University clini-
cians and police (Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of California, 1974). In essence, the Court 
imposed a new duty on clinicians to warn po-
tential victims of a threat posed by a client-
patient:    
 
When a doctor or a psychotherapist, 
in the exercise of his professional skill 
and knowledge, determines, or should 
determine, that a warning is essential 
to avert danger arising from the medi-
cal or psychological condition of his 
patient, he incurs a legal obligation to 
give that warning. (Ref .7, p. 555) 
 
 Here, the Court assumed that a clinician 
could accurately discern if a threat was viable 
and foresee the harm. Thus, a clinician could 
be liable if he or she recognized the danger or 
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should have recognized the danger and did 
not warn the potential victim (Weinstock, 
Vari, Leong, & Silva, 2006). 
 The Court’s decision (known as Tarasoff I) 
prompted strong responses from the mental 
health community. The American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) and other professional or-
ganizations filed with the Court an amicus curiae 
brief (i.e., a petition from a third party in-
tended to persuade or otherwise influence a 
court to act in a certain manner) and requested 
a rehearing of the matter. In its brief, the APA 
argued that clinicians could not accurately 
foresee future acts of violence, nor could they 
guess all of the potential victims of the client-
patient.  In addition, the APA argued that the 
decision eroded the critical tenet of confiden-
tiality, widely assumed to be a precondition 
for the development of a therapeutic rapport.  
 In an unusual decision, the California Su-
preme Court agreed to re-hear the case. In its 
second opinion (known as Tarasoff II, 1976), 
the Court increased the scope of the clinician’s 
liability, creating a ―duty to protect‖ in place 
of the narrower ―duty to warn.‖ Warning a 
potential victim was one way of fulfilling the 
new duty to protect, although not the exclu-
sive means: 
 
When a therapist determines, or pur-
suant to the standards of his profes-
sion should determine, that his patient 
presents a serious danger of violence 
to another, he incurs an obligation to 
use reasonable care to protect the in-
tended victim against such danger.  
The discharge of this duty may require 
the therapist to take one or more vari-
ous steps, depending on the nature of 
the case.  Thus, it may call for him to 
warn the intended victim or others 
likely to apprise the victim of that 
danger, to notify the police or to take 
whatever other steps are reasonably 
necessary under the circumstances 
(Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of 
California, 1976, p. 340).  
Again, the Court required clinicians to accu-
rately discern the violent intent of their clients 
and identify potential victims. How? The 
Court relied on clinicians to exercise a 
―reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and 
care ordinarily possessed and exercised by 
members of that professional specialty under 
similar circumstances‖ (p. 349).   
 How the Court arrived at its decision has 
been a matter of considerable debate, espe-
cially since the decision has broad implications 
for all mental health practitioners, regardless 
of the state in which they are licensed. Com-
mentators have described the Court’s reason-
ing as ―convoluted‖ and ―opaque‖ (Herbert, 
2002) and in disagreement with the basic ele-
ments of tort law (i.e., civil, not criminal law) 
(Walcott et al., 2001). 
 At its heart, the Tarasoff II decision rests on 
two fundamental ideas. First, the Court relied 
on a quasi-Good Samaritan argument, holding 
that it was good public policy for a clinician to 
break confidentiality and warn a potential vic-
tim where a client makes a viable threat 
against them. As Justice Matthew Torbriner 
famously wrote: 
 
Our current crowded and computer-
ized society compels the interdepend-
ence of its members. In this risk-
infested society we can hardly tolerate 
the further exposure to danger that 
would result from concealed knowl-
edge of the therapist that his patient 
was lethal … (Tarasoff, 1976, p. 347-
248). 
 
 Second, the Court held that a clinician and 
client had a ―special‖ (i.e., legally binding) rela-
tionship that imposed duties outlined in the 
Restatement 2d of Torts:   
 
There is no duty to control the con-
duct of a third person as to prevent 
him from causing physical harm to 
another unless … a special relation 
exists between the actor and the third 
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person which imposes a duty upon 
the actor to control the third person’s 
conduct, or a special relation exists 
between the actor and the other which 
gives the other the right of protect … 
(Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 315
(a) (1965)).   
 
Here, the Court acknowledged that Poddar 
was never under the clinician’s control or cus-
tody (in the sense of being committed) but 
decided that the fact that a threat was made by 
Poddar against Tarasoff was enough to trigger 
the ―duty to control the conduct … or to 
warn of that conduct‖ (Tarasoff, 1976, p. 342). 
The Court did not explain what information 
was needed for the clinician to properly iden-
tity a potential victim (Herbert, 2002). How-
ever, the decision made by this court resulted 
in many states either (a) interpreting the Tara-
soff ruling to relevant state-level cases, effec-
tively creating additional precedent for clini-
cians to consider or (b) reactively creating stat-
utes by state legislatures to explicitly address a 
mental health practitioners responsibilities re-
lated to Tarasoff-type duties to warn and pro-
tect. As reviewed in the next section, the re-
sulting case and civil laws have much variabil-
ity and is idiosyncratic to each state. 
 
Tarasoff Across the Nation 
 
 Once a legal precedent is set in one juris-
diction, it is often a matter of time before 
similar or related circumstances allow an op-
portunity for a judgment of its application 
may be applied to other jurisdictions. This was 
the case with Tarasoff. The Tarasoff  II deci-
sion was authoritative only in California, i.e., 
only courts in California were bound by the 
California Supreme Court’s ruling, but courts 
and legislatures in other jurisdictions have 
looked to that decision to guide and apply 
their own case law and statutes. Since the 1976 
decision, a number of courts across the coun-
try have used the Tarasoff case as a model to 
impose new responsibilities on their own clini-
cians, essentially calling on clinicians to more 
accurately predict violence and identify poten-
tial victims. For example, in Lipari v. Sears Roe-
buck & Co. (1980), the U.S. District Court in 
Nebraska held that a clinician is to protect not 
just individuals but the general public from 
the danger posed by a patient-client. Here, 
Ulysses Cribbs was a patient-client in treat-
ment at a Veterans Administration (VA) hos-
pital. Cribbs purchased a shotgun from a Sears 
catalogue, entered a nightclub and fired into a 
crowd, killing Dennis Lipari. Lipari’s estate 
sued the VA hospital. During trial, it was re-
vealed that Cribbs  had never informed the 
attending clinician of his murderous intent. 
Although there were no specific threats com-
municated, the U.S. District Court held that 
the VA clinician could foresee the patient-
client’s violent tendencies, and thus had a duty 
to protect any member of society endangered 
by those tendencies. In its aftermath, this case 
effectually brought a duty to warn to any men-
tal health practitioner in Nebraska.  
 Also, in Jablonski v. United States (1983), the 
U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, held 
that a patient’s general history of violence 
(absent specific threats) was sufficient for the 
clinician to predict the danger the patient 
posed to a particular victim. In this case, 
Jablonski was brought to a hospital after at-
tempting to rape his girlfriend’s mother. The 
attending psychiatrist concluded that Jablonski 
was a danger to others but that he did not 
meet the criteria for involuntary commitment. 
Less than a week after his release, Jablonski 
killed his girlfriend. The Ninth Circuit Court 
held that the hospital failed in its duty to pro-
tect the girlfriend, even though Jablonski did 
not make a specific threat against her. The 
Court also held that the cursory meeting be-
tween Jablonski and the psychiatrist was 
enough to create the special relationship from 
which the duty to protect arose, effectively 
reinforcing the outcome of the Lipari case 
(1980).  
 Other jurisdictions have provided a more 
restrictive interpretation of the Tarasoff case. 
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In Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980), for 
example, the California Supreme Court held 
that a clinician could not be liable for threats 
made against a large, unidentified public 
group. Here, James, a troubled youth, regu-
larly visited a clinician pursuant to court order. 
During therapy, James made general threats 
against his neighborhood, especially towards 
the young children there. He did not threaten 
any particular individual. Upon release from 
custody, James killed a five-year-old boy.  The 
boy’s parents sued, arguing that the clinician 
had a duty to warn and protect children in the 
neighborhood. The California Supreme Court 
disagreed, holding that James’s threats were 
too broad to trigger the clinician’s duty to pro-
tect. Similarly, in Leonard v. Iowa (1992), the 
Iowa Supreme Court refused to hold a clini-
cian liable when a client made threats against 
the general public. Other jurisdictions, includ-
ing Florida, Virginia, Mississippi, Texas, and 
South Carolina, have explicitly or implicitly 
rejected the Tarasoff duty to protect (Wallcott 
et al., 2001).  
 In response to the plethora of conflicting 
court decisions related to a clinician’s duty to 
protect, many state legislatures have moved to 
explicitly define the duties in law. To date, at 
least 23 states have codified the duty to pro-
tect. Five states (Idaho, Michigan, Montana, 
New Hampshire, and Virginia) have statutes 
that appear to create a definite duty to warn or 
protect.  Other states (Arizona, Colorado, 
Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jer-
sey, Tennessee, and Utah) have statutes that 
impose a duty to protect providing certain 
conditions are met, namely, the patient-client 
explicitly threatens an identifiable person or 
the patient-client has a history of violence and 
there is good reason to believe the patient-
client will commit serious violence. Two states 
(Florida and Mississippi) have permissive stat-
utes, providing that the clinician may break 
confidentiality and warn or protect at their 
discretion (Kachigan & Felthouse, 2004). 
Typically, the clinician can satisfy the statute 
by warning the potential victim or appropriate 
authorities or by hospitalizing the patient-
client (Walcott et al., 2001).   
 Clearly, the multiple interpretations of the 
original Tarasoff cases in various states has 
contributed to the confusion related to a clini-
cian’s duty to warn and protect. Although we 
review the history of the Tarasoff implications 
and relevant laws in North Carolina in the fol-
lowing section, the issue remains complex and 
often formidable to many clinicians. 
 
The Clinician’s Duty in North Carolina 
 
 What, then, is the duty of the clinician in 
North Carolina?  Has North Carolina adopted 
a Tarasoff-like ―duty to protect‖ any foresee-
able victim of harm?  The short answer is 
―No.‖  North Carolina has rejected the broad 
duties to warn and duty to protect any fore-
seeable victims found in Tarasoff and is one of 
thirteen states that currently has no statute 
defining this duty. In other words, the North 
Carolina General Assembly has not passed 
laws that explicitly define or outline a mental 
health care providers requirements to breach 
confidentiality in these circumstances and has 
rejected this duty in some rulings. That being 
said, North Carolina does impose on the clini-
cian a duty to protect third parties in certain 
narrow circumstances.  Clinicians should be 
aware of these circumstances. 
 North Carolina’s statutes are silent as to a 
clinician’s duty to warn or protect, so it is up 
to North Carolina courts to determine when a 
clinician is required to break clinician-client 
confidentiality (as provided in North Carolina 
General Statute 8-53.8).  It is to the courts that 
we now turn. 
 It is apparent from case law that the North 
Carolina courts reject a Tarasoff-styled duty to 
warn. In Moye v. United States (1990), for exam-
ple, the federal district court for North Caro-
lina held that even if a clinician had a duty to 
warn third parties about the danger posed by a 
patient-client, such a duty would not arise 
where the victim already knew the danger.  In 
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this case, Moye had a history of mental disor-
ders and violence for which he received treat-
ment at the Veterans Administration (VA) 
hospital. Doctors at the VA determined that 
Moye was not benefitting from treatment, and 
eventually Moye transferred to a private facil-
ity. He was later discharged for non-
compliance. Although they were aware of 
Moye’s violent tendencies, Moye’s parents 
took him into their home. Moye subsequently 
murdered them. Their estate sued, alleging 
that the VA was negligent in its duty to warn 
them of Moye’s violent tendencies. In trial, it 
was revealed that Moye’s parents knew of his 
violence and that they refused to administer 
the psychiatric medicine prescribed him. The 
federal district court for North Carolina re-
jected the estate’s claim: ―[A]ssuming …  [the 
duty to warn] exist[s], the duty [does] not arise 
where the foreseeable victim [knows] of the 
danger associated with the patient 
…‖ (Walcott et al., citing Moye, p. 182). 
 The court in the 2002 Gregory v. Kilbride case 
was even more explicit.  In this case, the estate 
of the patient and his wife brought suit for 
negligence after the attending psychiatrist re-
fused to commit the patient. Mark Gregory 
had threatened to kill his wife Kathryn and 
himself during the 36 hours that led up to a 
psychiatric examination by defendant Dr. 
Kevin Kilbride. Fearing for Mark and Kath-
ryn’s safety, Mark’s father, Lloyd Davis Greg-
ory, petitioned for Mark’s involuntary com-
mitment. Mark was taken to Broughton Hos-
pital where he was evaluated by Dr. Kilbride. 
Although Dr. Kilbridge determined that Mark 
suffered from adjustment disorder, he con-
cluded that Mark did not meet the conditions 
for involuntary commitment. Mark was re-
leased from the hospital. On the same day of 
his release, Mark shot and killed Kathryn be-
fore turning the weapon on himself. Lloyd 
Davis Gregory brought suit in his capacity as 
executor, alleging, among other things, that 
Dr. Kilbride breached a legal duty to warn 
Kathryn of Mark’s dangerous condition. The 
trial court granted a partial directed verdict  
(i.e., the presiding judge ruled before the case 
went before a jury) in favor of Dr. Kilbride, 
holding in part that the doctor had no duty to 
warn Kathryn of Mark’s release. The North 
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the lower 
court’s holding, flatly rejecting a Tarasoff-styled 
duty to warn (pg. 692). 
 In contrast, North Carolina case law does 
recognize a duty to protect, though this duty is 
different in quality from the duty to protect 
envisioned in Tarasoff. As noted above, the 
California Supreme Court created a broad 
duty to protect imposed on a clinician when a 
patient-client made a viable threat against a 
third party. North Carolina refines this duty by 
holding clinicians and other mental health 
professionals liable where the patient-client is 
under the clinician’s control. In Pangburn v. 
Saad (1985), Sheri Pangburn brought suit 
against Dr. M. Saad and Cherry Hospital in 
Goldsboro for injuries she suffered at the 
hands of her brother, Daniel Pangburn. 
Daniel had a long history of mental illness and 
violent behavior, and he had been committed 
several times. In 1982, Daniel was involuntar-
ily committed to Cherry Hospital. After con-
finement for some period of time, Daniel’s 
attending psychiatrist, Dr. Saad, decided to 
release Daniel, all over the strenuous objec-
tions of the Pangburn family. Within 16 hours 
of his release, Daniel assaulted Sheri Pangburn 
with a knife, causing severe injury. Sheri sued 
for damages suffered as a result of wrongful 
release. Dr. Saad argued that he had no duty 
to Sheri since he had no contractual relation-
ship with her. On review, the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that so 
long as a clinician has some control over a pa-
tient-client, the clinician owes a duty to fore-
seeable potential victims:   
 
[W]here the course of treatment of a 
mental patient involves an exercise of 
"control" over [the patient] by a physi-
cian who knows or should know that 
the patient is likely to cause bodily 
harm to others, an independent duty 
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arises from that relationship and falls 
upon the physician to exercise that 
control with such reasonable care as 
to prevent harm to others at the hands 
of the patient (pg. 338). 
 
 This decision was confirmed in another 
1985 case, Currie v. US.  Here, a psychiatrist at 
the Veterans Administration (VA) hospital in 
Raleigh was advised that a patient-client, Leo-
nard Avery, had threatened to blow up his 
place of work, the IBM facility located in Re-
search Triangle Park. The psychiatrist spoke 
with Avery and secured an agreement for a 
voluntary commitment, but Avery never 
showed for commitment. In subsequent con-
servations between the VA psychiatrist and 
Avery, Avery continued to make threats 
against IBM. The VA psychiatrist notified 
IBM and law enforcement agencies of these 
threats. VA psychiatrists and the medical staff 
at IBM discussed involuntary commitment 
proceedings but determined that Avery did 
not qualify. Avery later entered the IBM facil-
ity and killed an employee, Ralph Glenn. 
Glenn’s estate sued, alleging in part that the 
VA was negligent for not seeking Avery’s in-
voluntary commitment. On appeal, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, held for the 
VA. Applying North Carolina law, the federal 
court affirmed a Pangburn duty to protect 
when the patient-client is under a clinician’s 
control but also held that a clinician has no 
duty to commit.  
 The Pangburn decision was affirmed again 
by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in 
1995.  In Davis v. North Carolina Department of 
Human Resources, the estate of victim Phillip 
Davis brought suit against the North Carolina 
Department of Human Resources after a pa-
tient released from Cherry Hospital killed 
Davis. Dondiago Rivers had a history of hos-
tile and aggressive behaviors and had been 
committed to state mental institutions on 11 
occasions. In 1984, Rivers was involuntarily 
committed after being found unfit to stand 
trial for an assault charge. While in Cherry 
Hospital, Rivers was involved in several alter-
cations, but with treatment his mood stabi-
lized. In April 1985, Rivers’ attending psychia-
trist saw enough improvement to recommend 
that Rivers was fit for trial. The psychiatrist 
discharged Rivers but also noted in the dis-
charge papers that Rivers was still susceptible 
to incidents of violence. Upon discharge, Riv-
ers was seen by a psychiatrist at Dorothea Dix 
hospital, who also concluded that Rivers had a 
propensity for violence. In August 1985, Riv-
ers killed Davis after a verbal exchange at an 
intersection in Goldsboro. Davis’s estate sued, 
alleging that the state was negligent in releas-
ing Rivers from Cherry Hospital when it knew 
or should have known Rivers was violent and 
posed a danger to others. The trial court 
found the state liable. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed, holding that where a person is invol-
untarily committed for a mental illness, the 
institution has a duty to exercise control, and 
thus has a duty to protect third parties from 
harm caused by the patient-client (pg. 7).   
 In summary, North Carolina does not have 
a Tarasoff-like duty to warn (either established 
by statute or through case law), but North 
Carolina case law does impose a duty to pro-
tect third parties where a patient-client is un-
der the clinician’s control in a mental health 
capacity.   Furthermore, Licensed Professional 
Counselors in North Carolina do not have the 
authority to involuntarily commit or release 
from commitment (i.e., control) a patient-
client hospitalized for their propensity for vio-
lence. Moreover, the lack of legal duty for a 
clinician to break confidentiality and warn an 
intended recipient of violence by a patient-
client must be distinguished from the ethical 
considerations for a clinician. The following 
section will review those ethical implications 
that are consistent with extant case law in NC 
and those that contradict current practice. 
 
Ethical Duties for Counselors in  
North Carolina 
 
 Although the interpretation of legal prece-
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dents is often confusing and nuanced for pro-
fessional counselors in North Carolina, it is 
imperative that counselors understand their 
expectations, requirements and allowances 
from the legal perspective. As noted above, 
there is no statute or legal precedent that 
would compel a counselor to disclose threats 
of violence made by their client to an intended 
victim in North Carolina, although the case 
law (i.e., law created by the courts interpreta-
tions) does impose the duty to warn/protect 
when the client is in the physical and legal 
custody of the clinician (i.e., hospitalized). In 
fact, existing statute requires communication 
with clients to remain confidential. However, 
the ethical principles upon which our profes-
sion is based expects us to allow no harm to 
others, creating a legal and ethical mismatch 
and a dilemma for professional counselors to 
navigate. How might professionals handle 
situations in which we could prevent harm to 
another who is not our client? What of our 
ethical obligation and the legal requirement 
that we abide by our ethical code?  
 The American Counseling Association 
Ethical Codes (2005), which are adopted by 
the NC Board of Licensed Professional Coun-
selors, has established ethical principles that 
inform guidelines for duty to warn – auton-
omy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice, 
fidelity, and veracity. Although all of these 
principles apply to duty to warn cases, the 
most relevant to duty to warn issues are the 
autonomy of both the client and intended vic-
tim and the principle of nonmalefience, which 
requires counselors to allow no harm to oth-
ers. These have been translated into code in 
B.2.a Danger and Legal Requirements (ACA, 
2005):  
 
The general requirement that counsel-
ors keep information confidential 
does not apply when disclosure is re-
quired to protect clients or identified 
others from serious and foreseeable 
harm or when legal requirements de-
mand that confidential information 
must be revealed. Counselors consult 
with other professionals when in 
doubt as to the validity of an excep-
tion.  
 
Because there is no legal requirement that 
demands confidential information be revealed 
in duty to warn scenarios in North Carolina 
(as evidenced in the preceding section), there 
is a disconnect between what is expected le-
gally in North Carolina and what our ethical 
codes require. Although counselors may be 
justified ethically for breaking confidentiality 
in cases of threats of violence from a client 
toward a third party, there is no legal require-
ment or expectation to do so. In other words, 
counselors are expected to act as a reasonable 
professional would if they assess a client to be 
violent or dangerous to others, but this may or 
may not involve warning the potential victim 
if they are identifiable, based upon (a) the ab-
sence of statute requiring us to do so, (b) the 
statute deeming communications between a 
counselor and client confidential and privi-
leged, and (c) the contradictory ethical aspira-
tion to protect others. Therefore, the key 
question is ―How do counselors fulfill their 
ethical duties when no legal requirement ex-
ists?‖ In the next section, we suggest steps 
that consider both the ethical principles and 
codes for our profession and the statutes in 
existence in North Carolina.    
 
Steps a Clinician in North Carolina Can 
Take To Protect Themselves 
 
 North Carolina has no statute to guide cli-
nicians in their duties to warn or protect third 
parties from patient-clients. The situation can 
be dire.  ―The problem, of course, with a legal 
vacuum on so ubiquitous an issue is that the 
clinician is continuously in jeopardy: warn, and 
face breach-of-confidentiality exposure; keep 
silent, and risk a Tarasoff suit‖  (Herbert & 
Young, 2002, p. 280), or possibly a violent act 
toward a third party. The clinician can look to 
the courts, but case law is constantly evolving, 
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and what is true today may not be true in six 
months. However, our ethical codes, princi-
ples, and standards of practice – as well as the 
case law described above - can inform, guide, 
and even protect our practice to avoid such 
vexing circumstances and perhaps even mini-
mize any conflicts between ethical imperatives 
and legal considerations. In this section, we 
have synthesized and outlined suggested steps 
for mental health counselors to take in order 
to protect themselves from legal or ethical di-
lemmas and remain therapeutic when dealing 
with circumstances of violent clients that may 
lead to intentional breaches of confidentiality. 
For clarity and assistance in prioritizing these 
steps, we divide them into two categories, pro-
active and reactive (adapted from Borum & 
Reddy, 2001; Costa & Altekruse, 1994). 
 
  Some proactive steps to take with every 
client include: 
 
1. Obtain informed consent. Counselors    
must provide thorough and accurate infor-
mation to their clients about clients’ rights 
and counselors’ responsibilities. Therefore, 
counselors must educate themselves on 
the letter of the law regarding the require-
ments and exceptions around client confi-
dentiality and privileged communication. 
Because North Carolina assumes a nu-
anced approach, making agreements with 
the client about the counselor’s philoso-
phy, policy, and practice related to the 
communication of threatening communi-
cations from clients toward third parties 
should be reviewed explicitly in advance. 
In effect, informed consent is considered a 
contractual agreement with a client, which 
should include all potential exceptions to 
confidentiality. In fact, the North Carolina 
Board for Licensed Professional Counsel-
ors (NCBLPC) requires every Licensed 
Professional Counselor to whom it grants 
a license to include a copy of their Profes-
sional Disclosure Statement, which in-
cludes a section on the limits and excep-
tions to confidentiality dated on the initial 
date of service in every client’s file. This 
statement is to be signed by the client and 
be dated on the first date of service. How-
ever, this constitutes the minimum related 
to informed consent procedures and 
North Carolina counselors should aspire 
to provide more. Informed consent must 
be considered across multiple dimensions: 
it is both an event and an ongoing proc-
ess, it is both verbal and in writing, and it 
involves the rights and responsibilities of 
both the counselor and the client. Further-
more, descriptions of the informed con-
sent process within the case notes and 
signed copies of professional disclosure 
can further inform and protect the coun-
selor in duty to warn scenarios. Thorough 
and accurate informed consent is consid-
ered by these authors to be the strongest 
and most critical of the proactive elements 
related to the tension among a counselor’s 
responsibilities to the client, the public, 
the profession, the law, and to themselves. 
 
2.  Know your clients. Once a thorough and 
accurate presentation of informed consent 
is obtained from your clients, clinical as-
sessment is a critical process. This assess-
ment is two-fold: historical and current. 
Historical factors that must be explored 
include, but are not limited to, the client’s 
legal history, relationship history, present-
ing problems, and/or skills related to cop-
ing with anger or controlling impulses. 
Current factors may be related to specific 
triggers or cues to violent behavior, con-
current substance abuse, crossing interper-
sonal boundaries (e.g., excessive phone 
calls, unwelcomed visits), or preoccupa-
tion with weapons. A comprehensive bi-
opsychosocial assessment can assist a cli-
nician in deciding whether the client’s pre-
senting concerns are within the scope of 
competence, if the acuity of one’s caseload 
would allow a client with substantial risk 
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for safety, or if a referral to another clini-
cian is appropriate and ethically tenable. 
 
3.   Understand assessment procedures for 
violence. Although a thorough description 
of the assessment of violence is beyond 
the scope of this article, an article by Hag-
gard-Grann (2007) is a useful resource.  
 
4.  Develop contingency plans. Decide how 
you will respond before a scenario occurs. 
How will you intervene with a client? 
What resources will you access or leverage 
to help make your decision? While no one 
response pattern will be appropriate for 
every scenario regarding dangerousness, 
consider different protocols for how you 
will respond to overt threats to others dur-
ing a session with a client versus less clear 
clusters or patterns of symptoms that are 
suggestive of violence, but less concrete. 
You may want to write out a sample script 
for reminding clients of your contract with 
them regarding exceptions to confidential-
ity and practice it with other counselors. 
Keeping a list of areas to assess for vio-
lence, paper and pencil measures that can 
lend to your decision-making, and sample 
―Commitment to Treatment Statements‖ 
may also be helpful in developing contin-
gencies (for more detailed information, see 
Rudd, Mandrusiak, & Joiner, 2006). Also, 
outlining a procedure for you to follow 
(e.g., assessment procedures, the order of 
interventions from least to most restric-
tive, numbers to call, directions to a mag-
istrates office) if such a case were to arise 
is suggested.  
 
5.  Prepare for supervision and consultation. 
To guard against isolation and to build 
professional resources, all practitioners are 
well-served by developing a network of 
other practitioners, supervisors, liability 
insurance, professional association consul-
tation services, or even an attorney who 
can assist in making comprehensive, dili-
gent, and objective decision-making. 
Counselors must always be familiar with 
relevant statutes and follow emergency 
procedures or policies within agencies (or 
develop them if needed). 
 
Reactive Steps  
 
 When counselors do assess clients to be 
dangerous to others, we have summarized 
some relevant steps present in the literature 
and relevant to the expectations of all counsel-
ors: (Costa & Altekruse, 1994).  
 
1. Remind the client. Again, informed con-
sent is not only an event but a process. 
Although reminding a client of your agree-
ments related to breaching confidentiality 
related to their dangerousness may miti-
gate further disclosure, we must uphold 
the principles of autonomy (allowing client 
to make their decisions, as they are capa-
ble), veracity (being truthful about how we 
may respond), and fidelity (displaying loy-
alty toward our clients). Of course in situa-
tions where a client’s mental status is com-
promised, we aren’t able to legally re-
obtain consent or remind them of our pre-
vious agreements and must proceed ac-
cording to our clinical judgment. 
 
2. Involve the client. In addition to remind-
ing the client of the implications of their 
disclosures or of the response to your risk 
assessment, engage the client as you are 
able in any part of your course of action, 
as long as the client does not display cog-
nitive impairment and mental status ap-
pears to be intact. Perhaps the motivation 
for their disclosure of intense emotions or 
violent thoughts, plans, or intentions is to 
receive assistance or regain self-control. 
Sometimes it is difficult for clinicians to 
distinguish expressions of violence and 
desperation from intentions of violence. 
Clients may be willing to sign a release of 
information for you to make a disclosure, 
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make phone calls themselves, and/or 
commit themselves to treatment or to 
hospitalization. 
 
3.  Develop a safety plan. When risk factors 
are vague or diffuse, clinicians may decide 
to engage clients in developing a Commit-
ment to Treatment Statement or No-
Violence Contract, making arrangements 
to surrender weapons, or involve family 
members. If the risk of violence appears 
high or imminent, a plan for hospitaliza-
tion should be developed. 
 
4.  Use collaterals/key people. When imple-
menting your plan, you may need to in-
form supervisors, mental health authori-
ties, legal counsel, or law enforcement.  
 
5.   Obtain supervision/consultation. As an 
extension of the proactive preparation of a 
network of other clinicians, consultation 
can serve to obtain objective input. In 
anxiety-provoking or threatening situa-
tions, we may not consider all of the vari-
ables, possibilities, questions to ask, or 
courses of action, and colleagues and su-
pervisors can be valuable supports and 
resources. 
 
6.   Document carefully. Thorough and objec-
tive documentation is critical to all clinical 
practice but especially important in dealing 
with decisions to either maintain confiden-
tiality in cases of potential dangerousness 
or intentional breaches of confidentiality. 
In other words, whether or not a clinician 
determines a duty to warn or protect ex-
ists, they must document the circum-
stances, the rationale or thought process 
that led to the clinical assessment, and all 
of their courses of action and client re-
sponse. Although SOAP notes (subjective, 
objective, assessment, and plan) is a com-
mon format, we recommend a modified 
version that may better organize linearly 
this type of clinical encounter. DART 
notes include Description, Assessment, 
Response, and Treatment Plan. Specifi-
cally, the Description section might in-
clude client statements, client behavior, 
and other relevant circumstances, Assess-
ment will document all of the relevant fac-
tors or measures used to determine risk 
and justify action. Response should be 
inclusive of responses and actions of both 
clinician and client, including course of 
action while Treatment Plan will include 
long term needs beyond the immediate 
crisis. DART formatting is less subjective 
and places more emphasis on objective 
descriptions and clinician response. Other 
documentation should include relevant 
releases of information, clinical measures 
used, phone messages, and/or chronologi-
cal description of contacts with third par-
ties, as applicable. 
 
 One important caveat is that counselors 
should never place themselves in harms way. 
It is not within our scope of practice or legal 
responsibility to remain in dangerous situa-
tions with violent clients or to restrain, delay, 
or otherwise block the egress of a client for 
whom we have safety concerns. We should, 
however, enlist assistance to whatever degree 
is possible, beginning with the client and mov-
ing toward our colleagues, the family members 
of the client, other mental health providers, 
supervisors, and ultimately to law enforce-
ment, as needed. 
 
Summary 
 
 In this article, we have reviewed the land-
mark Tarasoff cases and compared their impli-
cations to the existing statutes relevant to pro-
fessional counselors in NC. We highlighted 
that there are no statutes requiring counselors 
to break disclosure when a client either verbal-
izes or poses a threat to another. However, 
there are court decisions in our state that 
would support a counselor’s attempts to pro-
tect potential victims based upon their deci-
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sion that a client is at high risk to commit vio-
lence. Furthermore, our ethical codes place 
priority over the safety and protection of oth-
ers to the preservation of a violent client’s 
confidentiality. In other words, counselors 
may be legally justified in either protecting the 
confidentiality of a client who poses or verbal-
izes a threat or in breaching this confidential-
ity and warning a third party of such a threat. 
The response depends on the diligence the 
counselor provides in systematically preparing 
for a situation in which they may choose to 
disclose in order to warn and/or protect a 
third party and their conscientiousness in 
weighing and applying the ethical principles. If 
an ounce of prevention is indeed worth a 
pound of cure, counselors will do well to en-
sure each of these steps is integrated into their 
counseling practice. However, access to legal 
counsel is always recommended to discuss 
specific circumstances and develop the most 
appropriate course of action.  
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